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Introduction
For many years there has been continual debate regarding the security of, and access to, the Department of Defense"s Global Information Grid (DoD GIG). Some advocate denying all access to the internet from official military systems, others advocate limited access to a selected set of users and a specific set of commercial web sites, while a third group advocates open access to all -and there is a range of opinions and exceptions within these three groups. This ongoing debate has intensified recently due to the increased use of Social Networking Services (SNS), often called social media, emerging media, or new media. The Department of Defense (DoD) has chosen a different term -Internet Based Capabilities 1 -to refer to these tools. The term social media will be used throughout this paper to describe the services that have been discussed most adamantly as increasing the security risk to the GIG. These social media services are: Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, Wikipedia, and blogs. Over the past year (2009), the DoD has been reviewing the use of, access to, and impact on both the information network and the work environment (productivity) of these social media services. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and each separate service within the Department -Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines -developed their own policies in the interim prior to the release of the DoD Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) on February 25, 2010. These interim policies ranged from deny all access (Marines) 2 to allowing unlimited access (Army) until an official DoD wide policy 3 is released. Each was different and caused confusion among the administrators, the users, the public (families, friends and supporters of the military service member), and other civilian and government agencies that work with the different services. The varied policies also caused confusion internally within the services, the senior leadership, and the individual military members who were expected to adhere to these policies. For example, is a Marine who is assigned to an Army installation and unit allowed to use social media services? Strict adherence to Marine policy states no, while Army policy states yes. It was also unclear to many if the restrictions applied only to the official military systems or extended to personal home use. It became quickly apparent that the lack of an official, clear, Department-wide policy was becoming both a personnel and a public relations issue. 4 A secondary question is the role of government developed social media tools used internally for collaboration, such as the Intelligence community"s Intellilink (a version of Wikipedia), Analytic Space (A-Space, a "Facebook for Spies" 5 ), and milSuite 6 .
These tools have been developed based on commercial designs, but are behind the GIG firewall, and thus (in theory) not as vulnerable to infiltration and other security concerns as are the commercial social media sites. Since these sites are password protected and access must be vetted and approved by a controlling authority, the audience is limited to those who are granted a certain level of "trust" by being a member of the larger government community. This trust relationship is at the heart of the uncertainty surrounding the opening up of DoD networks to commercial social media.
But with both types of social media tools (civilian and government), there is the overarching debate over the usefulness and appropriateness of these networking and collaboration tools in the performance of the DoD"s missions.
This paper will consider the use of commercial social media in the Department of 
Definition of Social Media
There are many definitions for social media (aka social networking, social software, emerging media, new media). For the purposes of this paper, social media refers to "an umbrella concept that describes social software and social networkingsocial software refers to various, loosely connected types of applications that allow individuals to communicate with one another, and to track discussions across the web as they happen". 15 In the Department of Defense, the social media used most prevalently are Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, and YouTube. It is these outward facing, public internet, commercial tools that are of concern and will be discussed in this paper.
Other social media tools used within the DoD GIG are used for collaboration in day-to-day operations. Some of these tools are Intellilink (a form of Wikipedia), "ASpace" (Analytic Space used in the Intelligence Community), and Web Logs (blogs).
The Army has developed its own suite of tools called "milSuite" 16 which contains features that attempt to replicate the commercial software look, feel and function: milWiki (Wikipedia), milBlog (blogs), and milBook (Facebook). These tools are advertised as "offering users an opportunity to learn, share and connect with the AKO/DKO 17 community". Each of these tools enables information sharing, collaboration, "crowd-sourcing", and the ability to reach and share information to build awareness and understanding with those outside of the immediate work environment and usual information channels. This is "networking" in the professional sense, and not subject to the same negative connotation of "social" networking given to the commercial social media tools that are believed to be a security risk to the military networks (the GIG).
Open Government Initiative
In These three strategies took the mandates from the National Strategy and developed details to guide their separate departments regarding information sharing internally within, and external to their own organization. 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and other recent national disasters have proven that the development and institutionalization of information sharing and collaborative tactics, techniques and procedures must be in place and practiced prior to the event occurring. This comprehensive chart provides a view of the myriad of applicable policies DoD agencies must adhere to in building, operating and securing the GIG. 31 The DASD(CIIA)
Network Security and Information Assurance Policies
Strategy "sets forth to support the DoD vision of freedom of action in cyberspace where:
 DoD missions and operations continue under any cyber situation or condition  The cyber components of DoD weapons systems and other defense platforms perform only as expected  DoD Cyber assets collectively, consistently, and effectively act in their own defense  The Department has ready access to its information and command and control channels and its adversaries do not 
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Apparently the FDCC was not the final solution. The Air Force has recently contracted with private industry for a $9.7 million dollar Host Based Security System (HBSS) 44 that will also be deployed throughout the GIG. Some of the benefits of this system are: Unfortunately, all of these standards cannot seem to stop network security breaches. Risk to the GIG with social media tools is no greater than inappropriate use of hardware. Examples of inappropriate use of hardware are two recent events regarding the use of USB devices which has caused a ban to be placed on these items until further guidance is developed. These examples are: USB devices containing worms and malware being used to transfer information from Secure (SIPRnet) systems to nonsecure (NIPRnet) systems 45 , and USBs containing sensitive military information found to be for sale at Afghan bazaars. 46 In both examples, it is the user (individual) who caused the insecurity, not the information system. Failure to properly use and maintain control of hardware is the cause of these insecurities. So, what is lacking in these policies? What is missing that is allowing an increasing number of network intrusions? Is it a lack of policies to cover each type of incident, or is it a failure on the part of the personnel implementing the policies? Is it a lack of skill, training, adherence to security requirements in the DoD workforce, or is it that there are so many policies, so many different types of hardware and software, and so many ways the "black hats" (bad guys) can stay ahead in the various ways they devise to introduce malware, Trojans or exploit the network through spear phishing attacks, that result in so much probing of, and successful attacks on, the GIG?
User Level Training
There are two main elements to user level training: training regarding the standards of use of the hardware and software assigned, and training on Operational Security (OPSEC) with respect to the information posted and shared over military information systems. Both of these are of major concern when discussing the use of social media on the GIG. OPSEC is also a concern over any communication mediumpersonal, telephone, letter, email, and social media -by members of the DoD. To assist in training OPSEC standards specifically regarding social media tools, the services have prepared brochures to guide the service member -and the family
member -in what they should and should not say when using these capabilities.
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Continual emphasis on this aspect of the use of social media tools cannot be ignored and must be at the forefront of operator training. But, the fear of OPSEC violations cannot be the driving factor in denying access to social media services. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels to train their employees and trust them enough to put this "weapon" in their hands as much as they train them on all other 
Social Media Use in the Department of Defense and other Federal Government Agencies
Over the past year, the use of social media services by the Public Affairs Checklist" 61 to accompany the DTM, providing additional OPSEC guidance specifically for social networking sites, and a link to educational games 62 to aid in training on the use of these internet tools. DoD personnel and others who follow the daily actions in of the DoD are celebrating the increased openness this memorandum is mandating; while others are more wary of the implications of increased access to Facebook and Twitter from the workplace -concerns ranging from network security issues to OPSEC issues to simply "wasting government time". This paper thus far has extensively detailed the current regulations that cover network security and OPSEC issues -"wasting government time" is covered in many personnel policies and is a leadership issue best addressed through appropriate channels.
The DTM also encourages DoD elements to register their social media sites so that the public will be able to distinguish those that are official from those that are not.
These official sites will be linked off of the main portal of each of the different Services Only over time will it be determined if the policy outlined in the DTM and supplemental Service specific memorandum are adequate to address the various concerns regarding social media use on the GIG. Until then -the DTM is written, and as with all DoD policies, it is to be followed. And as with all DoD policies, this one will be reviewed, revised and re-released as required.
Current findings of increased risk to the GIG due to use of social media
A review of recent articles in leading Federal and commercial Information
Technology and Information Security publications resulted in scarce discussion regarding increased vulnerability or security violations to the network through the use of social media tools. A popular belief is that the "tiny URL" used in Twitter is a leading source of malware. One study of over 1 million URLs discovered that only 0.06% redirected to malicious content. 69 One "risk" apparently unfounded.
Another study conducted by the Army found that "official Army Web sites violated operational security more than military bloggers". 70 This same report stated that resources were being "diverted from reviewing official sites by attention they have to give to Soldiers" blogs". One has to question, with reports such as these from the Army, why there is still such concern over individual soldiers" OPSEC on personal social media when the actual problem is individual user adherence to the policies when under the auspices of their official military duties. Could it be that the punishment for violations for personal use are more severe than those under professional use?
Conclusion and Recommendations
Rules, regulations, policies, standards, specifications -all are created by people, by humans. A review of numerous articles, reports, regulations and interviews has
shown that the biggest vulnerability in network security is the human in the loop. Even if information systems are automated to detect intrusions (which they are), it is the human that must ensure the most up-to-date version of the intrusion detection system is installed; it is the human that must check the logs and interpret them in order to understand and correct the vulnerabilities in the system. So, instead of reinforcing the opinion of the Pentagon cyber security official who believes there are a "bunch of idiots out there" 73 , efforts must focus on creating tools that are useable. Studies conducted at Carnegie Mellon University are pointing in that direction. Dr Lorrie F. Cranor, Director of Cylab Useable Privacy and Security states, "In order to develop tools that will be effective in combating these schemes (phishing), we first must know how and why people fall for them". 74 The same can be said regarding any aspect of network security -before we can be effective in combating these schemes, intrusions, insecurities, we must first understand why, in the face of numerous articles, reports, investigations, speakers, experts, salesmen and others -the human in the loop still decides to ignore the repeated warnings and education to properly utilize and maintain the GIG.
Implementing the "easy" solution does not solve the problem -"The armed forces find it much easier to ban something than to educate its troops about responsible use".
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The DoD must:
 Continue training on both network security and OPSEC  Continue partnering with industry to make security awareness and security tools more user friendly so they will be followed  Continue reporting attacks -sharing information regarding attacks with others will only strengthen the defense of the network overall. Learn from each other mistakes  Develop defense-in-depth techniques focusing more on protecting the data than on building a better wall to keep the cyber criminals out. Encrypt data so that only those authorized can obtain it, and teach users to not use the same password for each application and portal they use (one of the biggest vulnerabilities)
 Establish and enforce punishments for those network administrators who fail to properly perform their Information Security duties, and to those who provide information on official military web sites and social media sites as strongly and quickly as they are enforced to the individual service member on a personal social media site.
Information systems security starts at the beginning, with the education in our schools and our homes. Today"s generation has grown up using computers, and today"s generation will be the one to look to solve the vulnerability issues. The United States must increase education in the schools regarding cyber use, increase the interest in math and science for all students, and encourage young people to realize that computers do more than provide a great "toy" to talk to your friends and play video games. DHS Secretary Napolitano discussed the need to hire 1,000 cyber security experts over the next three years to meet the nation"s information security vulnerability challenges 76 , and both she and the newly appointed White House Cyber security
Coordinator are focusing on efforts to encourage the government, private sector, and citizens to all work together on these challenges. DHS is currently sponsoring a National Security Awareness Challenge to increase cyber security awareness and aid in cyber education efforts. 77 As the public becomes more educated in the realities of cyber security, the efforts of the Department of Defense will be better supported from a more informed public and a more educated pool of recruits (both civilian and military) to fill positions in units at all levels. 16 Access acquired through log-in and password access of Common Access Card and restricted to Army personnel, https://www.kc.army.mil/milsuite 17 AKO -Army Knowledge Online. DKO -Defense Knowledge Online. AKO provides the Army enterprise with email, directory services, portal, single sign on, blogs, file storage, instant messenger and chat. All members of the Active Duty, National Guard, Reserves, DA Civilian and select contractor workforce have an account which grants access to Army web assets, tools and services worldwide. In addition, retirees and family members are also entitled to accounts. All users can build pages, create file storage areas, and create and participate in discussion on the portal. Users can build custom access control lists for each piece of content they own to determine the audience allowed to see or use their content. As of this writing, AKO has 2.2 million registered users, and supports over 350K users logging in up to a million times a day as well as receiving and delivering on average 12 million emails daily, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_Knowledge_Online, (accessed on April 7, 2010).
